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Van Norden’s Manifesto 
Among the philosophers cited by Bryan Van Norden in the final chapter of his Taking Back 
Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto (2017) is Bertrand Russell, who praised philosophical 
contemplation for its capacity to expand “not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the 
objects of our actions and our affections.” Such contemplation, Russell continues, “makes us 
citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest.”1 Like Joshua’s 
Israelite army at Jericho, Van Norden wants to destroy walls, but not in order to invade the city 
of a perceived enemy. Rather, by shouting and trumpeting the benefits of multicultural 
philosophizing, Van Norden is encouraging everyone with a philosophical interest (which may, 
in some sense, be every human being simpliciter) to tear down the barriers that prevent the 
broadening of philosophical horizons (159). The barriers, as Van Norden sees it, are principally 
those constructed by an ethnocentric “Anglo-European mainstream” (2), which tends, largely 
through ignorance and prejudice, to neglect or disparage philosophical traditions outside the 
Western canon. A consequence of this ethnocentrism is that “less commonly taught 
philosophies” (LCTPs) remain underrepresented among the teaching and research activities 
pursued in philosophy departments, not only in the Western world but also in certain non-
Western countries whose educational institutions gravitate towards the Western model. (As we 
know, “globalization” is all too often a euphemism for Western cultural imperialism.) 
Van Norden also wishes to defend the value of philosophy more generally against attacks 
from anti-intellectualist politicians—who treat the category of “philosophers” as a paradigm of 
useless good-for-nothings—and from loudmouth public intellectuals, especially scientists, who 
vaunt the superiority of science over philosophy, typically on the grounds that science is 
capable of disclosing genuine truths about the universe whereas philosophy amounts to mere 
idle speculation. So the burden of Van Norden’s manifesto is not only to reclaim philosophy 
from those who would allow its pursuit in academic environs to remain blinkered by a 
monocultural mindset, but also to rescue philosophy’s humanistic ideal from the 
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misunderstandings fostered by a cultural milieu in awe of the achievements of natural science. 
As Wittgenstein observed in the 1930s, philosophers are as guilty of falling prey to this awe as 
is anyone else, for many of them “constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and 
are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does.”2 Although Van 
Norden does not cite Wittgenstein on this point—and would almost certainly take exception to 
Wittgenstein’s vision of philosophy as “purely descriptive”—he does recognize that 
philosophers share a significant portion of the blame for the widespread perception of 
philosophy’s futility. Instead of continuing philosophy’s ancient legacy of inquiring into how 
one ought to live, professional philosophy in the modern era has become increasingly academic 
in the worst sense of the word. Card-carrying “analytic” philosophers have frequently busied 
themselves with authoring arcane thought experiments—or, more often, embellishing existing 
thought experiments with their own minor tweaks—which encourage hyper-specialization 
rather than opening up dialogues about what is important in human life. 
Along the way, Van Norden also takes a swipe at “Continental thinkers,” many of whom he 
considers to be typified by Jacques Derrida, who, in the opinion of Martha Nussbaum (among 
other non-Derrideans), leaves the reader hungering for something philosophically substantial 
beyond all the verbal dexterity and clever textual analysis.3 If one were inclined to wonder 
whether such second-hand dismissals of Continental philosophy are not overhasty, Van Norden 
might remind us of the warning issued in his preface: that he has sought to fulfil his editor’s 
request to inject some cheekiness into his prose, and in doing so has “not shied away from 
being openly partisan” and more “sardonic” than he would normally be “in the classroom or in 
a scholarly publication” (xxiii–xxiv). 
Though perhaps lacking in philosophical rigor, then, Van Norden’s book nevertheless 
presents arguments that demand to be heard. On the whole, I agree with him. Having devoted 
a good deal of my academic career—and of my life—to the study of philosophies deriving 
from South Asia (in addition to many deriving from Europe and elsewhere), I thoroughly 
concur that such study can be philosophically valuable and life-enhancing, potentially saving 
one from the perils of an overly narrow perspective on the world and on human modes of 
engagement with it. For the purposes of this essay, however, I shall focus on elements of Van 
Norden’s arguments that need, in my view, to be thought through more carefully than Van 
Norden is able to do in the relatively small space that his manifesto affords. I concentrate on 
two issues in particular. First, in the next two sections, I offer some reflections on the overall 
impression given by Van Norden that incorporating non-Western material into standard 
philosophy curricula is not a difficult task and that all it really requires is the will to overcome 
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a culturally myopic inertia. While I admit that the difficulties should not be overestimated, I 
also wish to highlight some reasons why they should not be underestimated either. 
Second, I pick up on a threefold distinction that Van Norden introduces in his final chapter, 
between what he calls a “hermeneutic of faith,” various “hermeneutics of suspicion,” and 
“relativism” (see 139–142). While potentially fruitful as a starting point, the distinction, as Van 
Norden articulates it, omits certain possibilities and oversimplifies others. Notably, it omits 
what I, following the Wittgenstein-influenced philosopher D. Z. Phillips, am inclined to call a 
hermeneutics of contemplation. Moreover, by characterizing relativism in the way that he does, 
but then asserting baldly that it does not deserve to be taken seriously, Van Norden seems to 
preclude, a priori, a number of philosophical viewpoints that, I suspect, he would not really 
want to preclude—such as the perspectivism of Nietzsche, the internal realism advocated in 
some of Hilary Putnam’s writings, and certain interpretations or appropriations of the Jain 
“doctrine of many-sidedness” (anekāntavāda). Even if, after due consideration, one rejects 
these viewpoints as philosophically untenable, that is a very different matter from refusing to 
take them seriously in the first place. 
 
“Bringing into Dialogue”: Underplaying the Difficulties? 
Taking Back Philosophy’s longest and most philosophically substantial chapter is chapter 2, 
“Traditions in Dialogue.” It is here that Van Norden provides specific examples of how non-
Western philosophical ideas might be discussed in relation to existing issues in the curriculum. 
Noting, for instance, that a philosopher such as Descartes merely takes it for granted “that there 
must be individual substances distinct from all their qualities” (43), Van Norden recommends 
invoking as a counter-position the Buddhist “ontology of states rather than things” (44). This 
latter viewpoint is usefully propounded in the form of a dialogue between a Bactrian king and 
the Buddhist monk Nāgasena in the Pāli text known as The Questions of King Milinda (c. first 
century BCE). Van Norden’s other proposals include: confronting Hobbes’ conception of 
human nature as ruthlessly competitive with the more benign Confucian conception argued for 
by philosophers such as Mengzi (fourth century BCE); contrasting an Aristotelian understanding 
of ethical cultivation with Confucian, Buddhist, and Neo-Confucian versions; and turning to 
Chinese philosophers to enhance discussions of the problem of “weakness of will” in ethics. 
While admitting that, on account of his own areas of expertise, his choice of examples leans 
towards Chinese philosophy, Van Norden is confident that comparable examples could be 
drawn from other LCTPs, such as Indian, African, Native American, African-American, 
feminist, Islamic, Jewish, Latin American, and LGBTQ philosophies (82). This is no doubt 
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true, and the chapter does a convincing job of fulfilling its aim, which is to illustrate the 
bringing into dialogue of voices from philosophical traditions that were not, originally, in actual 
dialogue with one another. I am concerned, however, that by cherry-picking examples in the 
way that he has done, Van Norden presents an unduly rosy picture of comparative cross-
cultural philosophy. There are, in my view, also potential difficulties that ought not to be 
underplayed. 
Van Norden’s sanguinity is typified by a comment about Indian philosophy. “[A]ny 
acquaintance with Indian philosophy,” Van Norden affirms, “reveals that, in terms of both 
methodology and subject matter, it is philosophical even according to the most narrow 
standards that Anglo-European philosophy might supply. Just open a book!” (82). In response 
to this, I should like to emphasize: it depends on which book you open. One of my own principal 
areas of expertise is the darśanas (roughly, “schools” or “viewpoints”) of classical Indian 
philosophy known as Sāṃkhya and Yoga. The most authoritative texts of these schools are 
commonly referred to as the Sāṃkhyakārikā and Yogasūtra, respectively, both of which date 
from around the fourth or fifth century CE. If one were to naively open either of these texts, it 
is unlikely that one would be able to make much of them, even in English translation, without 
a good deal of surrounding contextual and interpretive information. The Sāṃkhyakārikā 
comprises a series of seventy-two two-line stanzas, each of which, despite forming a coherent 
semantic unit, is extremely dense. And the Yogasūtra is composed in the style typical of many 
classical Indian philosophical treatises, which involves the stringing together of a series of 
pithy statements or half-statements, each being an individual sūtra (literally, “thread” or 
“suture”) that is often barely intelligible without an accompanying commentary. Indeed, recent 
scholarship has suggested that the 195 sūtras (or 196, depending on which version one 
consults) that constitute this text were never presented in manuscript form independently of the 
commentary known as the Yogabhāṣya, the combined text-plus-commentary being designated 
the Pātañjalayogaśāstra.4 
Owing to the difficulty of understanding either the Sāṃkhyakārikā or the Yogasūtra, even 
when—or sometimes especially when—read in conjunction with traditional commentaries, the 
vast majority of modern scholarship surrounding these texts, both in India and in the West, is 
primarily exegetical in nature: it is an attempt merely to understand what the texts are saying, 
which is, of course, a necessary prerequisite for undertaking any philosophical engagement 
with them. My own approach has included drawing comparisons with aspects of Western 
philosophy, such as Kantian transcendental idealism and the phenomenology of Brentano and 
Husserl, for the purpose of explicating what I take to be the most coherent interpretation of the 
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Indian material. Provided one avoids simply imposing Western models upon the original 
sources, such comparisons can be illuminating. There is a sense in which this comparative 
approach brings Western and Indian philosophies “into productive dialogue,” yet it does so 
primarily for exegetical ends, not in order to set up an argument between two or more rival 
philosophical positions. Furthermore, the exegetical enterprise also demands several other 
factors, most notably a high degree of competence in the language in which the sources were 
composed—in this case classical Sanskrit—plus a thorough acquaintance with the 
philosophical milieu out of which the sources arose. 
Competence in the language is vital because texts such as the Sāṃkhyakārikā and Yogasūtra 
contain numerous technical terms that lack any straightforward English synonym. For example, 
the Yogasūtra defines its central term, yoga, as citta-vṛtti-nirodha. But what does citta-vṛtti-
nirodha mean? The range of possible translations is extensive. Citta is something like “mind” 
or “consciousness”; a vṛtti is, literally, a “turning” (related to Latin vortex), and hence can 
denote a “whirl” or “ripple” in a body of water. In view of what comes later in the text, citta-
vṛtti can be understood to mean “changing states of mind”5 or, in one influential early 
translation, “the fluctuations of mind-stuff.”6 Nirodha, meanwhile, derives from a verbal root 
meaning “to hold back, stop, hinder, shut up, confine, restrain, check, suppress, destroy,”7 thus 
suggesting that yoga consists in the “stilling” (Bryant) or “restriction” (Woods) of the states or 
fluctuations of the mind. But arriving at an approximate translation such as this hardly resolves 
the question of meaning. To understand what, for the school of philosophy known as Yoga, 
“stilling the mind” amounts to requires a detailed study of the text as a whole and probably of 
several commentaries on it as well. 
With regard to the philosophical milieu out of which Sāṃkhya and Yoga arose, available 
historical evidence is extremely thin. We have the names of authors to whom the primary texts 
have traditionally been attributed: Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the case of the Sāṃkhyakārikā and Patañjali 
in the case of the Yogasūtra. But we have no reliable biographical information about them. And 
neither of them claims to be the originator of the philosophies presented in the texts. The author 
of the Sāṃkhyakārikā states explicitly that he is merely expounding doctrines that have been 
passed down from the “highest seer,” which is generally treated as an epithet of a legendary 
figure named Kapila;8 and the Yogasūtra, enigmatically, declares Īśvara (roughly, “the Lord”—
not to be conflated with Īśvarakṛṣṇa) to be “the teacher of the ancients, because he is not limited 
by Time.”9 Thus, we do not really know when or where the philosophies of Sāṃkhya and Yoga 
originated; we can merely speculate on the basis of snippets of information derivable from 
traditional commentaries, supplemented by comparative analysis of ideas contained in the 
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classical sources and similar ideas expressed elsewhere, including in texts for which we have 
independent reasons for regarding as historically either earlier or later than the Sāṃkhyakārikā 
and Yogasūtra. 
We may also look to the texts of rival Indian philosophical schools, such as those of 
Vedānta, Nyāya, Buddhism, Jainism, and others, to find arguments against the views of 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga. But we should be wary of uncritically accepting interpretations of 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga put forward by proponents of these rival schools, just as we should be 
cautious about accepting interpretations of the rival schools presented in partisan Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga commentaries. As with any philosophical tradition, the painting of one’s opponents’ 
views in unfavourable colours can often prove to be a means of bolstering one’s own position 
that is too tempting to resist. The floors of many traditions are littered with discarded straw 
men, and that of Indian philosophy is no exception. This is why close attention to the original 
sources is indispensable, which, in turn, is why scholars have gone—and continue to go—to 
great lengths to furnish as much information, both contextual and based on close readings of 
the texts themselves, about what the sources are saying. Hence, while not all work in Indian 
philosophy is philological and interpretive in nature, a substantial amount of it is. So to imply, 
as Van Norden does, that one merely has to pick up a book on Indian philosophy and one will 
immediately see that this tradition is much like that of Western philosophy—with which it can 
readily “be brought into productive dialogue”—is, as it stands, in need of qualification. Some 
Indian philosophy lends itself to this purpose, but much of it needs to be studied at considerable 
length in relation to its own cultural context before it can be utilized for the sort of 
manufactured cross-cultural argumentative exchanges that Van Norden illustrates by means of 
his own examples from Buddhist and Chinese sources. 
These points that I have been making about the need for careful examination of original 
texts, informed by some knowledge of the language in which they were composed and of the 
cultural milieu from which they derive, bear upon Van Norden’s response to what he deems to 
be a “bad argument … against diversifying the curriculum” (32). The purportedly bad argument 
takes the form of the question “What would you have us cut? We can barely cover Western 
philosophy as it is!” Van Norden’s response acknowledges that the coverage of Western 
philosophy would indeed have to be reduced, but adds that covering all of Western philosophy 
was never a realistic prospect in the first place; since compromises are already being made, the 
replacement of some Western philosophy by content drawn from non-Western or other LCTPs 
would not be a radically new departure in this respect. But is the argument to which Van Norden 
is responding really so bad? In my view, Van Norden’s response overlooks a significant 
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difference between, on the one hand, introducing new material into a curriculum from within 
the philosophical tradition that is already being predominantly taught and, on the other hand, 
introducing material from a very different philosophical tradition. I shall elaborate this point 
below. 
 
Philosophizing Within and Across Traditions 
Having admitted the importance of comprehending “how doctrines and practices of 
argumentation are situated in their particular cultures,” Van Norden observes that “it is equally 
important to avoid the misconception that philosophy in the West is monolithic” (30). This is 
true, and it is a poignant reminder that there is no absolute differentiation between what we 
might call intra-traditional and cross-traditional philosophizing, respectively—intra-
traditional being the discussion of philosophical topics with reference to only one tradition 
(e.g., “Western philosophy” or “Chinese philosophy”) and cross-traditional being the 
discussion of such topics with reference to two or more traditions. Traditions, after all, are 
rarely sharply bounded: they tend to be both porous and internally variegated, frequently 
blurring into one another. As Van Norden highlights in chapter 1, there has in fact been cross-
fertilization between, for example, Chinese and European philosophy since at least the 
seventeenth century. So the idea of discrete and entirely heterogeneous philosophical traditions 
is naïve. It does not follow, however, that distinctions between different traditions cannot be 
made, for even if they have fuzzy edges, traditions may nonetheless be distinguishable in rough 
and ready terms. Indeed, any contention that philosophies from non-Western traditions ought 
to be integrated into the curriculum presupposes that traditions are distinguishable. 
My point is not that cross-traditional philosophizing should be avoided, but that the potential 
challenges it poses should be properly appreciated. In some instances, finding ways of 
overcoming these challenges—or of simply recognizing their existence—is apt to make cross-
traditional philosophizing all the more worthwhile, for doing so may, among other things, 
reveal philosophical possibilities (including possible understandings of what philosophy is) 
that would not otherwise have come to light. But entering into cross-traditional philosophizing 
with the blasé expectation that, in practice, it is no different from intra-traditional 
philosophizing carries the risk of being counter-productive. It carries this risk because, if 
students expect to be able to understand arguments from two or more traditions and to bring 
those arguments into dialogue when their knowledge of all but one of the traditions is extremely 
limited, there is a danger that an injustice will be done to the arguments from the less well-
understood tradition or traditions. 
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Needless to say, defining what a tradition consists in is no easy task. But in the case of 
philosophy, one of the common characteristics is its broadly conversational nature. It is no 
accident that Plato presented the bulk of his philosophy in dialogue form, for philosophy is 
typically pursued through communication with others: ideas are sharpened and arguments are 
refined by subjecting them to interrogation and contestation. Even when a philosopher, such as 
Descartes, adopts the conceit of having sought to devise a philosophical system “from first 
principles” by sitting alone in an isolated room,10 there nevertheless comes a point when the 
system must be tested out in the public arena and responded to by fellow philosophers, whether 
in face-to-face dialogue or in written form. Thus, when Alfred North Whitehead described “the 
European philosophical tradition” as “a series of footnotes to Plato,”11 he was, in part, 
emphasizing (albeit by means of deliberate exaggeration) the extent to which this tradition 
constitutes an ongoing succession of responses and counter-responses. Novel thoughts may 
arise from time to time, but not in a vacuum: they are invariably stimulated by ruminating upon 
the thoughts of others, even if those others lived and died several hundred years earlier. Western 
philosophy, we might say, is, like art or culture in general, a conversation over time.12 When 
communicating with one another, philosophers “count on mutual understanding insofar as they 
exploit a shared heritage, refer to a common canon, and use a common language (even if their 
language is broken into different dialects).”13 And something similar may be said about, for 
example, the philosophical traditions of China and India, and about other traditions as well: 
there need not be a common language in the sense that all contributors to the conversation must 
speak, say, Classical Chinese or Sanskrit, but the tradition gains its coherence from a certain 
shared heritage and set of reference points. 
A consequence of the conversational nature of philosophical traditions is that one’s 
understanding of current discussions in philosophy is likely to deepen by studying the history 
of the subject, for current discussions—when pursued competently—will be aware of, and will 
be responding either explicitly or implicitly to, ideas that have come before. Hence, one’s 
insight into Kant will be enhanced by studying the thought of Descartes and Hume, and one’s 
comprehension of Heidegger improves from learning about Aristotle, Kierkegaard, and 
Husserl. In the case of Chinese philosophy, the work of Mengzi and Zhu Xi will be better 
understood if one also studies Confucius. And in Indian philosophy, one needs to have some 
acquaintance with Abhidharma and Yogācāra Buddhism, and with classical Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga, if one is to appreciate how Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra, tries to 
differentiate his own nondualist philosophy from those other viewpoints. So, too, will one need 
some familiarity with the Upaniṣads, and perhaps the Bhagavad Gītā as well, to grasp the 
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background of Śaṅkara’s own thought. In turn, knowledge of Śaṅkara’s nondualist version of 
Vedānta is needed if the later Vedāntic systems, such as the “qualified nondualism” of 
Rāmānuja and the dualism of Madhva, are to be adequately interpreted. And so on. 
Again, none of this rules out the possibility of incorporating non-Western philosophy into 
the curriculum, but it does suggest that gaining a genuinely rich understanding of many 
important philosophical works will require learning about the traditions in which they are 
embedded. That takes time. And learning about a different tradition takes more time than 
learning about another work within a tradition with which one is already familiar. The 
investment of such time is apt to be well rewarded, for it facilitates not merely a new viewpoint 
within an existing set of disputes but, potentially, a radically new vista upon a divergent 
disputational landscape—a way of seeing things from a different cultural as well as a different 
philosophical perspective, perhaps one that deploys a markedly different conception of what, 
from a Western point of view, has been called philosophy. But the investment of time is 
significant, and this significance ought not to be glibly dismissed on the grounds that 
compromises are already being made in the coverage of Western philosophy. Building a 
philosophy curriculum that is cross-traditional and multicultural should be done. But doing it 
well is not easy. 
 
Hermeneutics and Neglected Options 
Turning now to Van Norden’s concern with philosophical methods, I want in this penultimate 
section to consider the threefold distinction that Van Norden adumbrates—between what he 
calls a “hermeneutic of faith,” various versions of a “hermeneutic of suspicion,” and, thirdly, 
“relativism.” According to Van Norden, a hermeneutic of faith consists in reading texts with 
an attitude of hope that one may discover in them qualities of “truth, goodness, and beauty,” 
whereas a hermeneutic of suspicion involves seeking motives behind a text “that are unrelated 
to its truth or plausibility”—motives such as economic or political advantage “as well as sexist, 
racist, or imperialist conceptions of the world” (139). Without wishing to reject either of these 
hermeneutical orientations, Van Norden proposes that a focus on suspicion has become 
pervasive in the humanities and social sciences, and that departments of philosophy “are often 
the last refuge of the hermeneutics of faith” (140). 
Although Van Norden does not cite Paul Ricoeur in this connection, it is from Ricoeur that 
the distinction between a hermeneutics of faith (or a “hermeneutics of recollection”) and a 
hermeneutics of suspicion derives. For Ricoeur, these notions have specifically religious 
implications: a hermeneutics of suspicion is an interpretation that strives to demystify religion 
“Citizens of the Universe”  78 
 
(in the manner exemplified by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud) whereas a hermeneutics of 
recollection is one “that tries to grasp, in the symbols of faith, a possible call or kerygma”14—
a religious message that speaks to one personally. Evidently, Van Norden is extending these 
terms beyond the sphere of religious texts and symbols to encompass approaches to the 
interpretation of texts more generally. What both he and Ricoeur neglect is the possibility of 
an approach that, while being properly philosophical, endeavours neither to demystify and 
debunk nor, necessarily, to discover values to adhere to. The neglected approach, which has 
been dubbed by D. Z. Phillips a hermeneutics of contemplation,15 is one that prioritizes 
understanding the variety of ways of being human over the advocacy or condemnation of any 
of those ways in particular: it aims to disclose “possibilities of sense” within human forms of 
life and discourse, salvaging them from the tendency, especially common among philosophers, 
to prematurely foreclose certain possibilities in the haste to develop general theories. As with 
Wittgenstein’s note of caution about philosophers being beguiled by the methods of science, a 
hermeneutics of contemplation eschews the “craving for generality” in favour of giving due 
attention to particular cases.16 Far from ignoring matters of truth, goodness, and beauty, a 
contemplative hermeneutics would investigate the variety of meanings that the concepts of 
truth, goodness, and beauty can have in multiple contexts, instead of assuming from the outset 
that each of these concepts must have an essential and uniform meaning across all contexts of 
use. 
Given its opposition to essentialism and its emphasis on the recognition of a plurality of 
ways of being human, a hermeneutics of contemplation is well suited for cross-cultural 
philosophical inquiry. It is concerned, precisely, with finding “intriguing conceptual 
possibilities,” which is part of what Van Norden himself aims to achieve in his exposition of 
alternative philosophical perspectives (82). So, I submit, a hermeneutics of contemplation 
deserves a place alongside the hermeneutics of faith and of suspicion in the list of options 
available to the multicultural philosopher. 
Van Norden’s own third option, however, is what he calls “relativism.” Yet it is not really 
a third option in Van Norden’s eyes, since he considers relativism to be philosophically 
worthless—not even deserving to be taken seriously (140). Despite this, Van Norden does go 
to the trouble of distinguishing two varieties of relativism: cognitive and ethical. Cognitive 
relativism is the view that the truth-value of any proposition “depends upon the perspective 
from which [it is] evaluated” (140). The view has long been recognized to be incoherent, Van 
Norden remarks, because it undermines itself: if it is held to be objectively true, then it asserts, 
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inconsistently, that there is at least one nonrelative truth; but if it is held to be true merely 
relative to the proponent’s perspective, then it provides no basis for anyone else to accept it. 
Ethical relativism, meanwhile, “asserts that the truth or falsity of evaluative claims (and 
only evaluative claims) depends upon the perspective from which they are evaluated” (141). It 
is unclear to me why Van Norden refers to “evaluative” rather than merely ethical claims here. 
If he means to include all evaluative claims—such as aesthetic, legal, political, and religious, 
as well as ethical ones—then the form of relativism at issue would be more aptly named 
evaluative relativism or value relativism. But, in any event, Van Norden, while admitting that 
the view is not incoherent in the way that cognitive relativism is, considers it to be “a banal 
dead end in philosophy” (141). It is a dead end because it affords no practical guidance about 
what, ethically, to think or do. If one maintains that the truth-value of ethical judgments is 
relative to individuals, then no help is offered for someone trying to make an ethical judgment; 
and if one maintains that the truth-value of such judgments is relative to cultures, then no help 
is offered in cases where divergent judgments are present within the same culture (and trying 
to determine which “subculture” one belongs to is unlikely to help either, Van Norden adds). 
If one were to claim that ethical relativism fosters tolerance towards other peoples and cultures, 
then one would have overlooked a crucial implication of ethical relativism itself—that whether 
one should be tolerant is dependent on one’s own (cultural or individual) perspective. All of 
these are fair points. In fact, one might get the impression that, by making them, Van Norden 
comes close to appearing as though he is taking relativism seriously as a position, or set of 
positions, that deserve to be countered. But Van Norden’s self-confessed grumpiness about 
relativism seems out of step with his overall openness to conceptual possibilities. Indeed, his 
characterizations of relativism are so quick and dirty that they run the risk of foreclosing 
discussion about more subtle positions that many would call versions of relativism—positions 
which, even if one disagrees with them, undoubtedly do deserve to be treated with 
philosophical seriousness. (As Van Norden says in connection with Buddhist, Confucian, and 
Neo-Confucian philosophers, “It’s fine to tell me that you don’t agree with them, but 
philosophy is not about teaching only figures whom you agree with” (82). The same applies, I 
am contending, to the work of sophisticated philosophical relativists.) 
I do not have space here to go into detail about versions of relativism that warrant serious 
philosophical scrutiny, but, as a starting point, one might mention the “perspectivism” of 
Nietzsche, the “internal realism” of Hilary Putnam, and certain interpretations of the Jain 
“doctrine of many-sidedness” (anekāntavāda). In the case of Nietzsche, we are confronted with 
an eloquent and provocative non-systematic thinker who revels in metaphor and hyperbole. 
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Notoriously, when railing against “positivism”—which he characterizes as the insistence that 
“There are only facts”—Nietzsche replies, “No, facts are precisely what there is not, only 
interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’: perhaps it is folly to want to do such a 
thing.”17 By Van Norden’s lights, the claim that there are no facts, only interpretations, would 
appear to suffer from the incoherence of cognitive relativism: if what is asserted is to be taken 
as true, then, in effect, what we are being asked to accept is that it is true—and hence a fact—
that there are no facts, which is incoherent; alternatively, if we treat the assertion as the mere 
expression of an interpretation, which overtly disavows any claim to be factual, then we are 
left wondering why we should accept it. This would be a tempting way of evading the challenge 
that Nietzsche, in his work more generally, poses; for if we take the time to go beyond 
superficial readings, we are apt to find a multifaceted thinker who, in certain places, strives to 
carry through a radical rejection of the very norms of rationality upon which the superficial 
readings depend. For instance, in many places, Nietzsche celebrates the affirmation of life over 
the affirmation of truth: in these moods, Nietzsche regards the essential question as being not 
whether a judgment is true or false—or even coherent (by conventional standards)—but rather 
“to what extent it is life-promoting.”18 This shift of priorities—from truth to “life,” or indeed, 
in other places, from truth to power—is profoundly unsettling for the philosopher who can see 
no purpose in philosophical argumentation if it is not directed towards truth. But that capacity 
to unsettle us—and not infrequently to advance a startlingly perceptive observation about life 
or the world (which, ironically, may strike us as all too true)—is part of the wonder of reading 
Nietzsche. Relativist or not, he deserves to be taken seriously—and I suspect that Van Norden 
would agree (not least because he cites Nietzsche several times in his book). 
As for Putnam, he put forward his internal realism in the early 1980s as an alternative to 
metaphysical realism, which he defines in terms of three main theses: first, that “the world 
consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects”; second, that “[t]here is exactly 
one true and complete description of ‘the way the world is’”; and third, “Truth involves some 
sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and sets of things.”19 Internal 
realism, by contrast, maintains that the question “what objects does the world consist of?” 
makes sense only within what Putnam variously terms a “theory of description,” a “scheme of 
description,” or a “conceptual scheme.” On this view, it makes no sense to suppose that objects 
could exist as objects independently of any conceptual scheme, for it is the conceptual scheme 
that divides up the world into distinguishable objects. While some commentators would 
construe this as a form of antirealism, Putnam calls it internal realism because it maintains that 
the objects we, as individuals, perceive and think about do really exist independently of our 
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own thoughts and perceptions, albeit not independently of the conceptual scheme within which 
our perceiving and thinking are occurring. In effect, then, Putnam’s theory—which, admittedly, 
he later came to modify and partially disavow—amounts to a form of conceptual relativism: 
what counts as an object (how we conceive of it), and hence also the truth about any object, is 
relative to a conceptual scheme—that is, to a system of concepts that operates within a given 
human community. Again, as with Nietzsche’s perspectivism, Putnam’s internal realism seems 
to fall within Van Norden’s definition of cognitive relativism, for it does indeed assert that “the 
truth or falsity of all claims depends upon the perspective [in this case, the conceptual scheme] 
from which they are evaluated.” And yet, I presume Van Norden would agree that the numerous 
philosophers who have engaged, whether sympathetically or critically, with Putnam over this 
view—including Putnam himself—are not thereby making the mistake of taking seriously 
something that does not deserve to be. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning here the Jain anekāntavāda, which translates as “non-
onesidedness [hence: many-sidedness] doctrine.” Although most scholars agree that this was 
not, in its original form, a doctrine of cognitive relativism, it has nevertheless lent itself to 
overtly relativist interpretations or appropriations. The classic exposition of the doctrine 
utilizes the well-known parable of the blind men and the elephant, in which several blind men 
each touch part of an elephant and assume, on that basis, that they know what the whole 
elephant is like.20 Clearly, what the parable does not illustrate is the absence of objective truth; 
indeed, the implication is that a fully enlightened individual—a Jina—would be capable of 
seeing the whole elephant and hence knowing the whole of reality. But since the achievement 
of such enlightenment is, for most of us, a very long way off, the parable, and the doctrine it 
illustrates, is generally understood to promote a strong form of epistemic humility according 
to which all views should be treated as merely partial and perspectival. This radical 
perspectivalism has, in certain instances, been construed in relativist terms, which is in fact 
how it is articulated on one of the most prominent Jain websites, according to which “Jainism 
developed the theory that truth is relative to the perspective (naya) from which it is known.”21 
My point is not that such interpretations ought to be accepted uncritically, but simply that they 
should not be dismissed out of hand. “Relativism” is itself a many-sided doctrine—or 
multiplicity of doctrines—and Van Norden’s perfunctory repudiation on the basis of a crude 
typology does not do justice to the variety. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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In sum, then, I concur with Van Norden that philosophical contemplation can enable us to 
become, in Russell’s phrase, “citizens of the universe” as opposed to being parochially 
preoccupied with only a miniscule portion of it. Diversifying our philosophical interests to 
encompass traditions beyond the Euro-American mainstream can contribute significantly to 
that widening of horizons, and, yes, students ought to be given “the opportunity to be inspired 
by [for example] Buddhism in addition to Platonism, or Confucianism in addition to 
Aristotelianism” (Van Norden 101). We should not, however, presume that the task of 
curriculum expansion is an easy one, not least because learning about a philosopher, or a school 
of philosophy, from another tradition demands—if it is to result in more than a superficial or 
distorted understanding—contextualizing that philosopher or school within the larger tradition 
itself. This amounts to more work than simply introducing another Western philosopher into 
an existing Western-focused curriculum. 
Moreover, I have contended, we should be open to methodological pluralism, too, and 
recognize more hermeneutical options than the binary picture of “faith” versus “suspicion” 
sketched by Van Norden. And finally, this openness should preclude casual dismissals of 
complex and ramified philosophical positions—such as the multiplicity of relativisms—on the 
basis of cursory definitions that fail to consider actual versions of the positions at issue. 
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